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ABSTRACT
The need to evict compromised, faulty, or illegitimate nodes
is well understood in prominent projects designing security
architectures for Vehicular Communication (VC) systems.
The basic approach envisioned to achieve this is via distri-
bution of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Nonetheless,
the problem of how to distribute CRLs effectively and ef-
ficiently has not been investigated. In this paper, we ad-
dresses exactly this problem. We propose a flexible, simple,
and scalable design that leverages on road-side VC infras-
tructure. Our scheme can distribute large CRLs across wide
VC regions within minutes, by utilizing a bandwidth of only
a few Kbps at each road-side infrastructure unit.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [General]:
Security and Protection; C.2.1 [Network Architecture and
Design]: Wireless Communication
General Terms: Security, Design, Performance.
Keywords: Security, Revocation, VANET.
1. INTRODUCTION
Ongoing efforts to design VC security architectures, e.g.,
SeVeCom [1], IEEE 1609.2 [2], seek to secure communica-
tion and protect private user information. The envisioned
VC systems rely on multiple Certification Authorities (CAs),
with each CA managing identities and credentials for nodes
(vehicles and road-side units (RSUs)) registered within its
region (e.g., national territory, district, county). Each node
is uniquely identified and holds one or more private-public
key pairs and certificates, digitally signing messages it trans-
mits.
Nodes holding keys and credentials, however, do not nec-
essarily comply with the implemented protocols. They may
be faulty or illegitimately obtain private keys [3]. To en-
sure the robustness of the VC system, it is important to
evict faulty nodes and prevent the utilization of compro-
mised keys. The distribution of Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) is the basic approach: each CA adds to its CRL reg-
istered nodes’ certificates that have not expired yet and it
deems it must revoke, and it periodically publicizes the CRL.
Providing CRLs across the wireline Internet is a long-known
practice that can be helpful in the VC context. For example,
in a pseudonymous authentication system, a CRL sent to a
provider of short-term VC credentials will expel a node by
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preventing it from obtaining new credentials [1]. Nonethe-
less, the distribution of CRLs across the wireless part of the
VC system, so that correct nodes can ignore messages signed
by revoked nodes, has not been investigated.
In this paper, we are concerned with exactly this funda-
mental problem: how to distribute revocation information
across a large-scale and multi-domain VC system, given the
constraints and challenges of the VC environment. We de-
sign a system, outlined in Sec. 2, able to deliver in a timely
manner the appropriate CRL to all vehicles within a region.
More important, we show that this can be achieved with-
out densely present road-side infrastructure, without RSU-
to-RSU communication, with CRLs that contain only re-
gional revocation information, in the presence of channel and
mobility impairments, and without interfering with time-
critical VC (e.g., for transportation safety applications). In
Sec. 3, we show that with sparsely placed RSUs transmitting
CRL data at rates of few Kbps, practically all vehicles can
receive securely the complete CRL within minutes.
2. SYSTEM OPERATION
The objective of our system is to ensure that upon is-
suance of a new CRL, at some time t0, the CRL is dis-
tributed via the RSUs within a delay ∆, to a fraction x of
all nodes that circulated in the CA region for at least ∆
seconds after t0. The system design should achieve an x
approaching to 1 and a low ∆. Rather than aiming for spe-
cific values for ∆, here we investigate the design space to
determine which values are achievable at what cost.
We propose a scheme with three basic elements. First,
the collaboration between regional CAs, so that CRLs con-
tain only regional revocation information and their size is
kept low. Second, the use of encoding of CRLs into nu-
merous (cryptographically) self-verifiable pieces, to provide
resilience to disconnections, radio impairments, and mali-
cious message injection. Moreover, the low-rate broadcast
transmission of CRL pieces by RSUs, to keep the CRL dis-
tribution efficient without interfering with other VC traffic,
especially leaving bandwidth available for time-critical VC
applications.
The multi-domain CA structure keeps CRL sizes low, but
vehicles need revocation information from other regions to
validate the certificates of foreigner (visiting) vehicles. Dis-
tributing CRLs of other regions in each region would be a
costly operation. Instead, we propose that only the CA vali-
dates certificates of visiting nodes; if they are not revoked in
their home region, it issues them short-lived Foreigner Cer-
tificates (FCs) which they must use in the foreign region. If
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Figure 1: Number of pieces to be received (Ptot) vs.
number of original CRL pieces (M).
the holder of an FC is revoked later on, it is included in the
CRL of the CA that issued the FC as an own certificate,
and its actual certificate is added to its home CA CRL.
The encoding of the CRL into multiple pieces can be done
in different ways, using Fountain or Erasure codes. Ini-
tially, the original CRL is segmented into M parts and then
encoded, with added redundancy. Erasure codes produce
N > M CRL pieces, such that for any M out of N pieces
received, the original CRL can be reconstructed [4]. Foun-
tain codes and among them a special class, Raptor codes,
with linear time encoding and decoding complexity [5], pro-
duce for M input pieces a potentially limitless stream of
output CRL pieces. For a tunable parameter σ > 0, the
original M pieces can be recovered with high probability
from any subset of M(1+ σ) CRL pieces. The CRL version
and timestamp, a piece sequence number, the CA identifier
and a digital signature covering all previous fields, are added
to each CRL piece, so that each of them can be validated
individually.
3. EVALUATION
We consider the size of the CRL, the average distance, D,
between successive RSUs, and the CRL distribution band-
width, rB . For more information and findings, due to space
limitations, we refer to [6].
Let P be the number of pieces a vehicle receives from
each encounter with an RSU, with a fraction of those pos-
sibly received during previous RSU encounters. The total
number of pieces, Ptot, a vehicle needs to receive in order
to recover the M segments of the CRL, depends on the en-
coding scheme. If no encoding but only CRL segmentation
is used, Ptot >> M , resulting in a considerable waste of
bandwidth. The benefits of encoding are shown in Fig. 1:
Erasure and Fountain codes yield an efficient scheme, with
Ptot ≈M , with the choice of a coding scheme possibly based
on its complexity and the existence of patents.
The time, T , over which a vehicle completes the reception
of a newly issued CRL with probability 99.99%, captures the
effectiveness of the scheme. If s is the size of the CRL data
contained in each CRL piece, o is the packet overhead, and
v the average vehicle velocity, P = rB
s+o
∗ R
v
is the number of
pieces received from one RSU. To complete the reception of
a CRL, a vehicle needs to encounter n = Ptot
P
RSUs. Thus,
for a vehicle encountering RSUs separated by distances Di,
T = 1
v
[∑n−1
1 Di +R
]
.
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Figure 2: CRL acquisition delay (T ) vs. bandwidth
(rB).
Fig. 2 shows T as a function of rB for three values of aver-
age RSU distance, D, RSU communication range of R = 300
meters, original CRL size of 200 KB, and an average vehicle
velocity of 40 km/h. D reflects the density of RSUs, which
at an early deployment stage will be sparse. T increases
with D, as a vehicle needs more time to encounter n RSUs
to complete the CRL acquisition. Fig. 2 shows exactly that
a moderate increase in rB quickly brings T down to ten
minutes or less.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We present a simple and robust design for CRL distribu-
tion in VC systems, leveraging on VC equipment that is to
be deployed. We find that with very low bandwidth used
for CRL transmissions, practically all vehicles can obtain
the latest CRL within tens of minutes, e.g., the duration
of a commute. Our analysis reveals trade-offs and how the
system can be configured to reduce the CRL acquisition de-
lay. Overall, scalability is achieved due to keeping CRL sizes
low and due to minimal RSU-CA and no RSU-RSU interac-
tions. As future work, we will investigate how to reduce T
further, for given RSU deployments, with vehicles relaying
CRL pieces over multiple wireless hops beyond the range of
RSUs.
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